Testing dynamic oligopolistic interaction: evidence from the semiconductor industry by Zulehner, Christine
www.ssoar.info
Testing dynamic oligopolistic interaction: evidence
from the semiconductor industry
Zulehner, Christine
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
SSG Sozialwissenschaften, USB Köln
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Zulehner, C. (1999). Testing dynamic oligopolistic interaction: evidence from the semiconductor industry.
(Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß
und Unternehmensentwicklung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel, 99-17). Berlin:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-194736
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
discussion papers
FS IV 99 - 17
Testing Dynamic Oligopolistic Interaction:
Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry
Christine Zulehner
September 1999
ISSN Nr. 0722 - 6748
Forschungsschwerpunkt
Marktprozeß und Unter-
nehmensentwicklung
Research Area
Market Processes and
Corporate Development
Zitierweise/Citation:
Christine Zulehner, Testing Dynamic Oligopolistic Interaction:
Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry, Discussion Paper
FS IV 99 - 17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 1999.
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH,
Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin, Tel. (030) 2 54 91 - 0
ABSTRACT
Testing Dynamic Oligopolistic Interaction: Evidence from the Semiconductor
Industry
by Christine Zulehner*
This paper analyzes the impact of a dynamic specification on the estimation of the
conduct parameter in an oligopolistic market. Various empirical studies have shown that
in the semiconductor industry, in particular in the Dynamic Random Access Memory
(DRAM) market, one has to account for dynamic elements as learning-by-doing within
firms and learning spillovers among them. Therefore this market seems to be
appropriate to investigate whether firms behave strategically in a dynamic sense and
how open-loop or closed-loop as equilibrium concepts alter the size of the estimated
parameters. I apply a structural oligopolistic model of dynamic nonprice competition
that incorporates learning-by-doing and spillovers. Theory shows that learning-by-doing
and learning spillovers have important consequences for firm behavior. Whether firms
in the DRAM industry take the strategic effects of learning-by-doing and learning
spillovers actually into account when choosing their output strategies, is answered with
empirical evidence. Using quarterly data from 1974-1996 at the firm level, I estimate
demand and pricing relations for three different generations of DRAM chips. The
empirical results show that the game theoretic specification has an important impact
and that firms behave strategically. The assumption of an open-loop specification would
underestimate the conduct parameter on average about 50%.
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JEL Classifications: L13, L63, C73
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Testen dynamischer oligopolistischer Interaktion: Empirische Evidenz aus der
Halbleiterindustrie
In diesem Arbeitspapier wird der Einfluß einer dynamischen Spezifikation auf die
Schätzung des Verhaltensparameters in einem oligopolistischen Marktes untersucht.
Verschiedene empirische Studien haben gezeigt, daß die Halbleiterindustrie, im
speziellen der Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Markt, von dynamischen
Elementen wie Learning-by-doing in Unternehmen und Learning spillovers zwischen
Unternehmen geprägt ist. Das wirft die Frage auf, ob sich Unternehmen in einem
dynamischen Sinne strategisch verhalten und wie open-loop beziehungsweise closed-
loop als Gleichgewichtskonzepte die Größe der geschätzten Parameter verändern. In
diesem Papier wird ein strukturelles oligopolistisches Modell in einem dynamischen
Kontext betrachtet, indem Unternehmen Mengen setzten und Learning-by-doing und
Learning spillovers relevant sind. Die Theorie zeigt, daß Learning-by-doing und
Learning spillovers wichtige Konsequenzen für das Verhalten von Unternehmen haben.
Ob die Unternehmen in der DRAM Industrie tatsächlich die strategischen Effekte aus
Learning-by-doing und Learning spillovers in Betracht ziehen, wird auf empirische
Weise versucht zu beantworten. Unter der Verwendung vierteljährlicher
firmenspezifischer Daten der Jahre 1974-1996 werden die Nachfrage- und die
Angebotsgleichung für drei Generationen von DRAMs geschätzt. Die Schätzergebnisse
zeigen, daß die spieltheoretische Spezifikation einen wichtigen Einfluß hat und daß sich
Unternehmen strategisch in einem dynamischen Sinne verhalten. So unterschätzt die
Annahme einer open-loop Gleichgewichtslösung den Verhaltensparameter im
Durchschnitt um 50% unterschätzen.
1 Introduction
In studying repeated games strategies are considered in which past play inuences current
and future strategies. Usually economists focus their attention on equilibria in a smaller
class of Markov or state-space strategies. In this case the past inuences the current play
only through its eect on a state variable that summerizes the direct eect of the past
on the current enviroment. There are two strategy concepts. Firms either use open-loop
or closed-loop strategies. The terms open-loop and closed-loop are used to distinguish
between two dierent information structures in multi-stage games. Open-loop strategies
are functions of calendar time only. In an open-loop equilibrium players simultaneously
commit themselves to entire paths of history. In a closed-loop information structure players
can condition their play on the history of the game. The term closed-loop equilibrium
usually means subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game, where players can observe and
respond to their opponents' actions at the end of each period. Closed-loop strategies
consider the state-space variable(s) as a strategic variable(s).
The objective of this paper is rst to empirically investigate whether rms act strategically,
in the sense of using closed-loop strategies, when they formulate their output strategies.
And if they do, what is the sign of this strategic eect. Do rms consider future output
of other rms as strategic substitutes or as strategic complements. The second issue of
this paper is to analyze how the dierent equilibrium concepts in state-space games in-
uence the estimated parameters in a structural model of dynamic quantity competition.
The industry, I concentrate on, is the semiconductor industry, in particular the Dynamic
Random Access Memory (DRAM) market. DRAMs are memory components (chips) and
are classied into generation. Various empirical papers have shown, that in this industry
one has to account for dynamic elements like learning-by-doing within rms and learning
spillovers among rms (see e.g. Irwin and Klenow [13], Gruber [10], Briest and Wilson [4]
and Siebert [19]). Therefore this market seems to be appropriate to investigate whether
rms behave strategically in a dynamic sense and how open-loop or closed-loop as equilib-
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rium concepts alter the size of the estimated parameters, where the main point of interest
lies on cost-price margins. Another reason why I direct my attention to that particu-
lar industry is, that semiconductors are an important input to several high-technology
industries. And DRAMs are usually thought of as technology drivers.
In learning-by-doing models rms learn either from their own experience, from the experi-
ence of other rms, or both. Learning-by-doing introduces an intertemporal component to
rms decisions. Under the assumption that an appropriate measure of experience is past
cumulative output, current production adds to the rm's stock of experience. Increases
in the rm's stock of experience reduce rm's unit costs in future periods. Theoretical
research demonstrate that learning can have sizable impact on cost and strategic decisions
and market performance (e.g. Spence [20], Fudenberg and Tirole [7]). If the rm's expe-
rience is completely proprietary, its optimal strategy is to overproduce in early periods in
order to invest in future cost reduction. Incumbent rms can exploit the learning curve
and will have an absolute cost advantage over potential entrants. Thus entry barriers can
be erected. However, if there are spillovers among rms the incentives for overproducing
diminish.
A lot of empirical studies have been made for the DRAM market. Most of the papers
investigate, whether learning-by-doing and spillovers are prevalent in that industry and
when yes, how large are these eects. The dierent setups vary to certain degree. Bald-
win and Krugman [1] did a simulation study for the 16K generation and this was the
pioneering attempt to incorporate learning economies into a stylized empirical model of
the semiconductor industry. Flamm [6] also completed a simulation study, but on the 1MB
generation. Further he used another theoretical model allowing for closed-loop strategies
in capacity and open-loop strategies in output. However, his simulations were extremely
sensitive to the specication of some parameters. These two papers deal with calibrating
theoretical models. Another part of the semiconductor literature considers econometric
models. Gruber [9], [10] estimated reduced form relation assuming constant cost-price
margins and he found economies of scale rather than learning-by-doing eects for var-
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ious generations of DRAMs. Irwin and Klenow [13] implemented a recursive dynamic
specication. They assumed constant returns to scale, Cournot behavior and used xed
elasticities of demand. Their results are learning-by-doing within and learning spillovers
among rms, but no spillovers among generations. Briest and Wilson [4] estimated both
a demand and a pricing relation of a dynamic game with open-loop strategies. Neglecting
learning spillovers among rms they showed learning-by-doing to be smaller in the pres-
ence of economies of scale and estimated markups. Siebert [19] used a dynamic model
with closed-loop strategies and allowed for multiproduct rms and rms' dynamics over
the product cycle. He found that learning spillovers and economies of scale eects and
that multiproduct rms behave as if in perfect competition. Learning by doing, learning
spillovers and economies of scale vary over the product cycle.
Given the reviewed literature the contribution of this paper is to test a dynamic closed-loop
specication, to compare the estimated parameters with those of the open-loop specica-
tion and investigate the inuence of the equilibrium concept on learning-by-doing, learning
spillovers, economies of scale and the conduct parameter.
The implication of learning by doing in production technology for market conduct and
performance can be modeled within a dynamic oligopoly game. Thus the consequences
of rms' using experience as a strategic variable can be considered. I apply the model to
the DRAM market. Departing from a dynamic oligopoly game the rst order conditions
for the open-loop and the closed-loop equilibrium are derived in order to implement an
econometric model. The closed-loop specication then enables me to evaluate the eect of
rm's strategy on the objective function of other rms in future periods. I assume a single
product market. A structural econometric approach is used for evaluating market power,
learning-by-doing, learning spillovers, economies of scale and strategic behavior. The
methodology involves a specication of demand and marginal cost functions and hypothe-
ses about the strategic interactions of the participants. Dierent behavioral assumption
about rms in the DRAM market are tested and the parameters for the demand and
the cost functions, including the parameters for market power, learning-by-doing eects,
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learning spillovers, economies of scales and strategic behavior are estimated.
Section 2 contains a description of the DRAM market. In Section 3 I set up the theoretical
model allowing rms to have open-loop and closed-loop strategies. The implemented
econometric model is given in Section 4. The data and the estimation procedure are
discussed in Section 5. Estimation results for three dierent DRAM generations are also
provided in this section. Conclusions are given in Section 6.
2 The DRAM Market
In this section I give a short description of the DRAM industry. More detailed descrip-
tions of that industry can be found in e.g. Gruber [12], [11], Irwin and Klenow [13] and
Flamm [6]. DRAM stands short for Dynamic Random Access Memory devices. These are
memory components (chips) designed for storage and retrieval of information in binary
form. One characteristic of DRAMs is that they loose memory once they are switched o.
They are classied into 'generations' according to their storage capacity in terms of binary
information units (BITS). DRAMs are a relatively homogeneous standardized products.
There are hardly any dierences among quality. However, dierent generations of DRAMs
represent dierentiated products. DRAMs are part of the semiconductor industry, in par-
ticular of memory chips. Semiconductors are a key input for electronic goods. The main
segments are computers, consumer electronics, communications equipment, industrial ap-
plications and cars (Gruber [11]). DRAMs are used when memory storage need not to be
permanent.
Memory chips like DRAMs are produced in batches on silicon wafers. The production
of semiconductors requires a complex sequence of photolithographic transfer of circuit
patterns from photo masks onto the wafer and of etching processes. The manufacturing
process has to be very precise in terms of temperature, dust, vibration levels and other
determinants. It is of fundamental importance that this process occurs in clean rooms, as
even tiny dust particles on the wafer surface interrupt the connecting pattern and thus
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the chip useless. The raw silicon wafer itself has to be free from any imperfections. The
wafer, once processed, is cut and the single chips are then assembled. The wafer processing
stage is the most critical and also the most costly. The main cost determinant of a chip
is the silicon material. Learning-by-doing takes place over the entire product cycle. In
the beginning of the chip production a large proportion of the output is usually defective
and has to be discarded. The yield rate, which is measured by the ratio of usable chips to
the total number of chips on the wafer, is very low then. Later on the yield rate increases
as rms learn. Thus the necessary amount of silicon and rms' cost decrease at the
same time. Therefore the use of the traditional measure of learning, namely cumulative
output, ts this pattern very well. Part of the semiconductor production knowledge can
be viewed as plant specic, because of the diÆculty of production knowledge transfer even
within one rm. However, there are several research and production joint ventures among
rms. Thus learning spillovers seem to be of some importance in that industry. Further
as capital expenditures for a state of the art production facility are very high, a rm's
primary concern is ensuring the ability to expand output as a means of spreading the xed
costs over a larger base to take advantage of the benets of economies of scale.
Table 1 shows in which year which generation of DRAMs were in the market. The very
rst generation of DRAMs, namely the 4K generation, emerged in 1974 and stayed in the
market until 1985. Two years after the start o of the 4K generation the 16K generation
was on the market. On average two to three years after one generation has emerged the
following generations goes on market. The last generation - 64MB - went on the market
in 1995 and is still at the beginning of its product cycle. Two exceptions are the 2MB and
the 8MB generations. These are byproducts and do not follow the general pattern.
One of the most interesting features of the DRAM market is the price decline at the
beginning of a new generation (see Figure 1). This price decline is very extreme. Within
the rst year the price for e.g. the 256K (1MB) generation fell about 60% (70%). Life cycles
of dierent semiconductor industries and generations are surprisingly comparable and
short-lived, very much tting standard product cycles. After introducing a new generation
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into the market, sales begin to take o slowly but at an increasing rate. Later on the
growth rate falls but sales continue to grow until the peak of the life cycle is reached (see
Figure 2). The time between introduction of a new chip and the peak in sales is relatively
short compared to other products. Dierent generations overlap form one generation to
the other. Entry into one generation occurs in the growth phase but not in the decline
phase (see Figures 3 to 5). Out of the description of the DRAM market one can conclude
that learning-by-doing, learning spillovers and economies of scale are evident. Thus a
theoretical model should take care of these features.
3 The theoretical model
In this section I present two models and implications of the theoretical models for the
estimations. In these two models rms are assumed to maximize their prots over the
product cycle. The rst model considers the case of learning-by-doing within each rm.
The law of motion for the state variable (i.e. cumulative output) describes how cumulative
output evolves over time within each rm. The second model allows rms not only to learn
from their own experience, but also from learning spillovers from other rms. Therefore
the law of motion for the state variable describes the industry experience vector (i.e.
cumulative output vector). Both models I solve for equilibria in open-loop and closed-
loop strategies, respectively. I divide into a model with learning-by-doing and a model
with learning-by-doing and learning spillovers, because it is then easier to explain all the
dierent eects that occur in that model. In fact, the model with learning-by-doing is
included in the other model.
In studying repeated games strategies are considered in which past play inuences current
and future strategies. Usually economists focus their attention on equilibria in a smaller
class of Markov or state-space strategies. In this case the past inuences the current play
only through its eect on a state variable that summarizes the direct eect of the past on
the current environment. I will use two strategy concepts. Firms can either use open-loop
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or closed-loop strategies. The terms open-loop and closed-loop are used to distinguish
between two dierent information structures in multi-stage games. Open-loop strategies
are functions of calendar time only. In an open-loop equilibrium players simultaneously
commit themselves to entire paths of history. Thus the open-loop equilibria are really
static, in that there is only one decision point for each player. The open-loop equilibria
are just like Cournot-Nash equilibria, but with a larger strategy space (Fudenberg and
Tirole [8]). In a closed-loop information structure players can condition their play at time
t on the history of the game until that date. The term closed-loop equilibrium usually
means subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game, where players can observe and respond to
their opponents' actions at the end of each period. Open-loop strategies are not perfect, as
they ignore deviations by subsets of positive measure (Fudenberg and Tirole [7]). An other
information structure would be feedback strategies. These strategies are like closed-loop
strategies, but do not depend on the initial value of the state-space variable as closed-loop
strategies do (see e.g. Feichtinger and Hartl [5]).
3.1 Model with learning-by-doing
Competition in an industry characterized by learning-by-doing can be modeled as a dy-
namic game, as learning-by-doing introduces an intertemporal component to rm's deci-
sions. In the theoretical model rms are modeled to maximize their prot over the product
cycle. Assume there are i = 1; : : : ; n rms and t = 1; : : : ; T discrete time periods
1
. At the
beginning of each period, rms choose quantities of a homogeneous output, q
it
. Firm i's
cost in period t, C
it
:= C(q
it
; x
it
;W
it
), is a function of current output, rm i's experience
and input prices. Experience is assumed to be measured by past cumulative output. Thus,
rm i's stock of experience is x
it
:=
P
t 1
s=1
q
is
. Output choices play an additional role as
investment into experience. The more output is produced today, the lower unit costs will
be tomorrow. Each rm i chooses q
it
in order to maximize intertemporal prots dened
1
Appendix C gives an overview of the used notation.
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as
Max
q
it

i
=
T
X
t=1
Æ
t 1
fP
t
 q
it
 C(q
it
; x
it
;W
it
)g
s.t. x
it
= x
it 1
+ q
it+1
x
i0
= 0 (1)
where Æ is the discount rate, q
t
:=
P
n
i=1
q
it
is industry output and P
t
:= P (q
t
) is the inverse
market demand function for a given generation. Firms are assumed to move simultaneously
like in a Cournot game.
The necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash equilibrium of (1) are
P
t
+
@P
t
@q
t

@q
t
@q
it
 q
it
=
@C
it
@q
it
+
T
X
s=t+1
Æ
s t

@C
is
@x
is

@x
is
@q
it
(2)
for all i = 1; : : : ; n and t = 1; : : : ; T . The left-hand side term of equation (2) is the standard
Cournot marginal revenue. The rst term of the right-hand side is the contemporaneous
eect of output on marginal cost, the standard marginal cost without learning-by-doing.
The second term is the discounted future cost saving of learning-by-doing gained through
the contemporaneous output decision. In case of learning-by-doing eects, this term should
be negative
2
. Both terms together denote dynamic marginal cost. Firms set marginal
revenue equal to dynamic marginal costs, which lie below static marginal cost and increase
output in order to benet from learning-by-doing and reduce future costs.
The necessary conditions for a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of (1) are
P
t
+
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t
@q
it
 q
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=
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T
X
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
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(3)
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
@q
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@x
is

@x
is
@q
it
for all i = 1; : : : ; n and t = 1; : : : ; T . The rst terms of equation (3) are again the stan-
dard rst order condition from the static Cournot problem without learning-by-doing.
2
A positive term would mean 'forgetting'.
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With closed-loop strategies learning-by-doing creates an explicit intertemporal link be-
tween strategies rms employ today and the competitive environment in which rms nd
themselves tomorrow. Firms anticipate correctly that prots from the next period forward
will be simultaneously determined by the output decisions of all rms in the current period
and by a similar set of decisions in all subsequent periods. The last term in the rst line
of Equation (3) is the discounted future cost saving of learning-by-doing gained through
rm's contemporaneous output decision. This eect is the direct eect of rm's output
choices on its payos. In case of learning-by-doing eects, this term should be negative.
Both terms together denote dynamic marginal cost. The terms in the second line show
the strategic eect. These eects arise from the intertemporal nature of strategies due to
learning-by-doing. Changes in rm i's strategy at time t aect rm i's objective function
in period s = t+1; : : : ; T through x
is
. This is true for all rms i. When learning-by-doing
reduces future costs, q
it
and q
is
will be strategic substitutes and rms may, by overinvest-
ing in experience, erect entry barriers (see e.g. Spence [20], Fudenberg and Tirole [7] ).
Firms set marginal revenue equal to dynamic marginal costs, and they consider also the
strategic eect. In case of strategic substitutes this eect has the same sign of the direct
eect, i.e. future cost savings can be strengthened by the strategic eect. If there is no
learning-by-doing and therefore no strategic eect, open-loop and closed-loop equilibrium
result in the same rst-order conditions.
3.2 Model with learning-by-doing and learning spillovers
This model now incorporates not only propriety learning but also learning spillovers among
rms. It is a similar model Jarmin [14] applied to the early rayon industry. Firms'
maximization problem is the same as before, only the cost function will additionally depend
on the experience of all other rms. Thus rm i's cost in period t, C
it
:= C(q
it
;X
t
;W
it
),
are now a function of current output, input prices, rm i's experience and experience of
all rms other than i. X
t
is the vector of cumulative output of each rm i, representing
the experience gain due to the learning-by-doing within the own rm and among other
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rms in the industry. Experience is assumed to be measured by past cumulative output.
Each rm i choose q
it
in order to maximize intertemporal prots dened as
Max
q
it

i
=
T
X
t=1
Æ
t 1
fP
t
 q
it
 C(q
it
;X
t
;W
it
)g
s.t. X
t
= X
t 1
+Q
t 1
X
0
= 0 (4)
where Æ is the discount rate, q
t
:=
P
n
i=1
q
it
is industry output and P
t
:= P (q
t
) is the
inverse market demand function for a given generation.
The necessary conditions for a open-loop Nash equilibrium of (4) are
P
t
+
@P
t
@q
t

@q
t
@q
it
 q
it
=
@C
it
@q
it
+
T
X
s=t+1
Æ
s t

n
X
j=1
@C
is
@x
js

@x
js
@q
it
(5)
for all i = 1; : : : ; n and t = 1; : : : ; T . The dierence of equation (5) to the rst-order
condition of the model with learning-by-doing lies in the second term on the righthand
side. Discounted future cost savings through the contemporaneous output decision are not
only due to own experience but also to learning spillovers from other rms. The righthand
side again denotes dynamic marginal cost. Firms set marginal revenue equal to dynamic
marginal cost, which lie below static marginal cost and increase output in order to benet
from learning-by-doing and spillovers and reduce future cost.
The necessary conditions for a closed-loop Nash equilibrium of (4) are
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+
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(6)
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for all i = 1; : : : ; n and t = 1; : : : ; T .
The rst terms of equation (6) are again the standard rst order condition from the
static Cournot problem without learning-by-doing and without spillovers. With closed-
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loop strategies learning-by-doing and spillovers create an explicit intertemporal link be-
tween strategies rms employ today and the competitive environment in which rms nd
themselves tomorrow. Firms anticipate correctly that prots from the next period forward
will be simultaneously determined by the output decisions of all rms in the current period
and by a similar set of decisions in all subsequent periods. The last term in the rst line
of Equation (6) is the discounted future cost saving of learning-by-doing and spillovers
gained through rm's contemporaneous output decision. This eect is the direct eect of
rm's output choices on its payos. In case of learning-by-doing and spillovers, this term
should be negative. Both terms together denote dynamic marginal cost. The terms in the
second line show the strategic eect. These eects arise from the intertemporal nature of
strategies due to learning-by-doing and spillovers. Changes in rm i's strategy at time t
aect rm j 6= i's objective function in period s = t+ 1; : : : ; T through x
is
. When learn-
ing is proprietary, q
it
and q
js
will be strategic substitutes and incumbent rms may, by
overinvesting in experience, erect entry barriers (Spence [20], Fudenberg and Tirole [7]).
Spillovers reduce the ability of incumbents to deter entry by accumulating experience.
Firms set marginal revenue equal to dynamic marginal costs, and they consider also the
strategic eect.
3.3 Some implications for estimation
The term 
1it
:=
@q
t
@q
it
denes the conduct parameter and measures the market power of
rm i in an industry (see e.g. Bresnahan [3]). The price-cost markup can be dened as
P MC
i
P
:=  

i

1
 s
it
, with
1

1
=
@P
t
@q
t

q
t
P
t
and s
it
=
q
it
q
t
representing the elasticity of demand
and market shares, respectively. In a competitive market a change in rm i's output
would not have any consequences on prices. Firms price according to their marginal costs.
Thus the conduct parameter and the price-cost markup would be both equal to zero. In
a Cournot game a change in rm i's output has impact on prices. Firms price higher
than their marginal costs and the conduct parameter would be one, the price-cost markup
equal to
1

1
. If rms maximize joint prots, the conduct parameter would be equal to
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the number of rms in the industry and the price-cost markup also that times higher. In
empirical studies the conduct parameter is often estimated. Parameter values other than
above described then indicate for example, whether market behavior is more competitive
than Cournot in case of a value lower than one, or more collusive than Cournot in case
of a value greater than one. The conduct parameter is important for determining rms'
behavior in an industry.
3
In the model with learning-by-doing and spillovers I dene the term 
2it
:=
@q
js
@x
is

@x
is
@q
it
as
the strategic parameter.
4
It varies over rms and measures how a change in rm i's output
at time t changes rm j's output at time s; s > t. If rm i's experience is proprietary
and it behaves rationally, the expected sign of the strategic parameter is negative. q
it
and q
js
are then strategic substitutes. If rm i's experience benets no one, the estimate
of this parameter should be zero. The expected sign of the strategic parameter when i
rival benet from its experience is ambiguous. If learning spillovers are strong enough, the
strategic parameter could be positive. And if this strategic parameter is positive, then q
it
and q
js
are strategic complements.
The term DMC = SMC+CMC denotes dynamic marginal cost with statically marginal
cost SMC =
@C
it
@q
it
and cumulative marginal cost CMC
it
=
P
T
s=t+1
Æ
s t

P
n
j=1
@C
is
@x
js

@x
js
@q
it
.
The rst term indicates the contemporaneous marginal cost, whereas the second expression
refers to the intertemporal eect of learning-by-doing and spillovers. If learning-by-doing
and/or spillovers are present, then the intertemporal eect will be negative. The derivative
of DMC with respect to q
it
is equal to @DMC = @SMC + @CMC. With economies of
scale the rst term is negative and consistent learning curves and spillovers imply the
second term to be negative as well (see also Berndt [2] and Jarmin[14]). This results in a
negative derivative of dynamic marginal cost.
Comparing the outputs of the open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in the model with
learning-by-doing and learning spillovers, leads us to following corollary.
3
For a thorough discussion on conjectural variation see for e.g. Martin [15].
4
See also Jarmin [14] for a discussion on that parameter.
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Corollary 1. Assuming a linear demand function the output in a closed-loop equilibrium
is greater (smaller) than in an open-loop equilibrium for all rms and for points in time,
i q
it
and q
js
are strategic substitutes (complements) for all and across all rms in the
industry and for all s = t+ 1; : : : ; T .
Proof. The proof is shown when q
it
and q
js
are strategic substitutes, i.e. the strategic
parameter
@q
is
@x
js

@x
js
@q
it
< 0 for 8i; j and 8s = t + 1; : : : ; T . For the case of strategic
complements the proof is analogous.
At equilibrium the rst-order conditions (5) and (6) in open-loop and closed-loop strate-
gies, respectively, are equal to zero with identity; i.e. FOC
O
(q
O
it
)  0 and FOC
C
(q
C
it
 0.
Evaluating the rst-order conditions in closed-loop strategies at q
O
it
gives:
FOC
C
(q
O
it
) = FOC
O
(q
O
it
) 
T
X
s=t+1
Æ
s t

@P
s
@q
s
(q
O
it
)  q
O
is

n
X
j=1
@q
s
@q
js

@q
js
@x
is

@x
is
@q
it
(q
O
it
)
(7)
I
@q
is
@x
js

@x
js
@q
it
< 0;
then
T
X
s=t+1
Æ
s t

@P
s
@q
s
(q
O
it
)  q
O
is

n
X
j=1
@q
s
@q
js

@q
js
@x
is

@x
is
@q
it
(q
O
it
) > 0; (8)
as Æ > 0;
@P
s
@q
s
(q
O
it
) < 0; q
O
is
> 0 and
@q
s
@q
js
> 0:
From equation (7) and inequality (8) it follows then that
FOC
C
(q
O
it
) > 0 8i; t (9)
and this is equivalent with q
C
it
> q
O
it
;8i; t.
This corollary states the equivalence of strategic substitutability (complementarity) and
that then the output path in closed-loop strategies is greater than the output path in
open-loop strategies. Fudenberg and Tirole [7] have already shown for a two period game,
that the output in closed-loop equilibrium is always higher than that in the open-loop
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equilibrium. Given this corollary and the rst order conditions the consequences for the
estimations can be written down.
In fact, the rst order conditions give following advice for empirical testing. The dier-
ence between open-loop and closed-loop rst order conditions can be pinned down by the
strategic parameter 
2it
. If this term is not equal zero, we can conclude that rms use
closed-loop strategies. On other hand if this term equals zero, nothing can be said. The
situations where rms either use open-loop strategies or closed-loop strategies without a
strategic impact cannot be distinguished. If there is strategic interaction, two possibil-
ities emerge: i) 
2it
< 0, i.e. q
it
and q
js
are then strategic substitutes. There is either
only learning-by-doing or learning-by-doing and not large enough learning spillovers. That
means the learning-by-doing eect still exceeds the learning spillovers. ii) 
2it
> 0, i.e. q
it
and q
js
are then strategic complements. Here we have learning-by-doing and large enough
learning spillovers. The learning spillovers are larger than learning-by-doing eects. The
sign and the signicance of 
2it
can be tested.
From the corollary (1) the implications on the estimates of various parameters can be
explored, when the true strategies are closed-loop but one estimates the open-loop spec-
ication. How does the estimate of the conduct parameter change? An other question I
want to address is, how do dynamic marginal cost change in a closed-loop equilibrium com-
pared to an open-loop. Further the implications for the estimation of economies of scale,
learning-by-doing and learning spillovers are asked and stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 2. If q
it
and q
is
are strategic substitutes (complements) for all and across all
rms in the industry and the closed-loop specication is true, then in an open-loop speci-
cation
i) the estimated conduct parameter 
1it
; i = 1; : : : ; n would be underestimated (overesti-
mated); or
ii) dynamic marginal cost DMC
it
would be underestimated (overestimated); or
iii) economies of scale, learning-by-doing and learning spillovers would be overestimated
(underestimated).
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Proof. The proof is shown for the case of strategic substitutes, i.e. the strategic parameter
@q
js
@x
is

@x
is
@q
it
< (>) 0 for 8i; j and 8s = t+ 1; : : : ; T . The arguments for the other case are
analogous.
i) I denote now the conduct parameter in the open-loop setting with 
O
1it
and that in the
closed-loop setting with 
C
1it
. Setting q
O
it
= q
C
it
and subtracting then equation (6) from
equation (5) and transforming gives
@q
t
@q
it
O
=
@q
t
@q
it
C
+
8
<
:
T
X
s=t+1
Æ
s t

@P
s
@q
s
 q
is

n
X
j=1
@q
s
@q
is

@q
is
@x
is

@x
is
@q
it
9
=
;
=

@P
t
@q
t
 q
it

(10)
If q
it
and q
is
are strategic substitutes the inequality (8) is true and the second term of the
righthand side of equation (10) is negative and gives an underestimated conduct parameter
in the open-loop specication.
ii) Now I denote dynamic marginal cost with respect to their equilibrium, DMC
C
and
DMC
O
. Arguing like in i) gives
DMC
O
(q
it
) = DMC
C
(q
it
)  Æ
s t

@P
s
@q
s
 q
is

n
X
j=1
@q
s
@q
js

@q
js
@x
is

@x
is
@q
it
: (11)
The second term on the righthand side of equality (11) is positive and therefore dynamical
marginal cost are underestimated in the open-loop specication.
iii) follows from ii).
Corollary (2) describes empirically testable hypotheses, which are derived from a theoret-
ical model. Thus if e.g. strategic substitutability is prevalent in an industry an open-loop
setup would underestimate the conduct parameter, dynamic marginal cost and would
overestimate economies of scale, learning-by-doing and learning spillovers.
4 Econometric Implementation
For the empirical implementation I now consider the model with learning-by-doing and
with learning spillovers. The empirical model of the DRAM industry consists of a demand
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equation and of two pricing relations for each rm based on equations (5) and (6). This
gives two systems of equations, one for the model open-loop strategies and one in closed-
loop strategies. For estimation structure has to be placed on the demand and on the cost
function, as demand and cost parameters enter the pricing relations. Also econometric
error terms have to be introduced in order to estimate the model.
4.1 Inverse demand equation
The elasticity of demand play an important role in the pricing relations. The inverse
demand function is specied as
ln(P
t
) = 
0
+ 
1
 ln(q
t
) + 
2
 ln(q
S
1
t
) + 
3
 ln(q
S
2
t
) + 
4
 ln(Y
t
) + 
5
 t+ 
t
; (12)
where 
i
; i = 1; : : : ; 5 are the parameters to be estimated. P
t
is the average selling price
of a chip at time t , q
t
is the output of the chip at time t, q
S
1
t
and q
S
1
t
are respective
quantities of substitute semiconductors, Y
t
is a vector of other nonprice demand shifters
and t is a time trend. The parameters to be estimated reect the own elasticity of demand,
cross elasticities of demand, the eect of demand shifters on a DRAM generation, and a
trend that captures the eect of time a particular generation has been on the market. As
substitute semiconductors I take the proceeding and the following generation of DRAMs.
4.2 Pricing relations
The empirical model of pricing is a generalized rst order condition which allows market
structure to be estimated rather than imposed. The econometric implementation of the
open-loop equilibrium goes in one line with Brist and Wilson [4]. However, they do not
consider learning spillovers and neither input prices. Additionally, I set up the rst-order
conditions in closed-loop strategies in an analogous way. Then I compare the two estimated
parameter sets.
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4.2.1 Specication of the marginal cost function
The empirical pricing relations require expressions for marginal cost. These expressions
include parameters that measure learning-by-doing and learning spillovers. The marginal
cost function I approximate with a Cobb-Douglas type function. Marginal cost look like
MC
it
= 
1i
+ 
2i
 ln(q
it
) + 
3i
 ln(x
it
) + 
4i
 ln(
X
l 6=i
t 1
X
j=0
q
lj
) +
X
h

hi
 ln(P
I
hit
) (13)
for i; j = 1; : : : ; n and t = 1; : : : ; T . Like Brist and Wilson [4] I allow for nonconstant
returns to scale in the empirical marginal cost function, too. Learning-by-doing is mea-
sured by cumulative output x
it
. Learning spillovers are assumed to be symmetric and are
dened by past cumulative output of other rms (
P
l 6=i
P
t 1
j=0
q
lj
). P
I
h
1
it
denote various
input prices, i.e. price for silicon, for energy, for wages and for capital.
4.2.2 Equilibrium relation
Structure has to be placed also on the contemporaneous and on the dynamic eects con-
tained in the rst order conditions. I then test the eect of a rm's strategy on the objective
functions of other rms in future periods by comparing the open-loop specication with
the closed-loop specication. However, the model would be overparameterized if all terms
that measure future eects were to be estimated. Following Roberts and Samuelson [18]
and Jarmin [14], I capture all dynamic eects that occur two or more periods into the
future via a rm specic constant. For the open-loop equilibrium relation the rm-specic
constants are dened as follows

1ij
=
T
X
s=t+1
Æ
s t

@C
is
@x
js

@x
js
@q
it

1i
=
n
X
j=1

1ij
:
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In the closed-loop equilibrium relation they are dened as

2ij
=
T
X
s=t+2
Æ
s t

@P
s
@q
s
 q
is

n
X
j=1
@q
s
@q
js

@q
js
@x
is

@x
is
@q
it
 
T
X
s=t+1
n
X
j=1
@C
is
@x
js

@x
js
@q
it
 
@C
is
@q
it

2i
=
n
X
j=1

2ij
:
Firm specic xed eects capture dierent 'things' in these two settings, respectively.
I then specify the following strategic parameters

1i
=
@q
t
@q
it

2ij
=
@q
jt+1
@x
it+1

@x
it+1
@q
it

2i
=
n
X
j=1

2ij
where 
1i
reects the conduct parameter. If, for example, it is zero, then competitive prices
result, is the conduct parameter equal to one, Cournot prices result. 
2
captures the eect
of rms' strategy on the objective function of other rms in the next period and it appears
in the closed-loop specication only. If rm i's experience is proprietary and it behaves
rationally, the expected sign for 
2i
is negative. q
it
and q
jt+1
are then strategic substitutes.
The econometric model of the pricing relations is then for the open-loop equilibrium
P
t
= 
1i
+ 
2i
 ln(q
it
) + 
3i
 ln(x
it
) + 
4i
 ln(
X
l 6=i
t 1
X
j=0
q
lj
) +
X
h

hi
 ln(P
I
hit
)
+ 
1i
  
1
 
1i
 P
t
 s
it
+ 
it
(14)
and for the closed-loop equilibrium
P
t
= 
1i
+ 
2i
 ln(q
it
) + 
3i
 ln(x
it
) + 
4i
 ln(
X
l 6=i
t 1
X
j=0
q
lj
) +
X
h

hi
 ln(P
I
hit
)
+ 
2i
  
1
 
1i
 P
t
 s
it
  
1
 
1i
 
2
 P
t+1
 s
it+1
+ 
it
(15)
for i; j = 1; : : : ; n and t = 1; : : : ; T and where s
it
=
q
it
q
t
.
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5 Estimation results
Two systems of equations are estimated, namely equations (12) and (14) for the open-
loop equilibrium and equations (12) and (15) for the closed-loop equilibrium. I run the
estimations for three dierent generations of DRAMs, namely the 64K, the 256K, and the
1MB generation.
5
This selection relies primarily on the fact that not all generations of
DRAMS were in the market for a long period of time (see Table 1). Thus I do not consider
generations, which give too less data points. Especially, the generations 64K and 256K
are of further interest as these were under dumping investigations by the US Commerce
Department and the International Trade Commission (see e.g. Flamm [6]).
In Table 2 all rms which produce the 64k, 256K or 1MB generation of DRAMs are listed
with their respective market shares. The Herndahl Indices for each year are given for
these generations in Table 4.
For estimating the demand and price relations for three dierent generations I use single
equation techniques, in particular 2SLS for the estimations. The instruments in the inverse
demand equation consist of the exogenous variables in the demand equation and summary
measures from the supply side, like average market share, number of rms in the industry,
and cumulative world output. I also include lagged prices as instruments. For the pricing
relation I use exogenous variables in the specication, the age of the generation, the
nonprice demand shifters, and lagged (input) prices as instruments.
The estimates of the demand equation with their respective standard errors in parenthesis
are reported in Table (5) for three dierent generations of DRAMs. This table further
gives the results of a General Method of Moments estimation, which has been conducted
because of poor Durbin-Watson statistics in the 2SLS estimations. However, the esti-
mated parameters do not dier substantially. Each generation's own demand elasticity
is negative and signicant. The estimates across generations with respect to their own
demand elasticity range from  0:3370 to  0:7607 and  0:6192 for 64K, 256K and 1MB,
5
In Section D a detailed description of the used data is given.
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respectively. The results for the elasticities of one's generation own demand are in one
line with previous literature (see e.g. Flamm [6] or Brist and Wilson [4]). The elasticities
of a previous generation are positive and signicant, those of the following generations
are negative and are signicant for the 64K and the 256K generation. The nonprice de-
mand shifters have the right sign and are signicant for the 64K and the 256K generation.
The remaining demand determinant, the time trend, should be negative, suggesting that
buyers substitute away from the generation as time elapses. The estimations results show
that for the 64K and the 256K generation.
For the pricing relation I estimate the two specications: The rst one assumes non-
constant returns to scale, learning by doing, learning spillovers and a estimated conduct
parameter, corresponding the open-loop equilibrium. The other specication has an ad-
ditional strategic interaction parameter and reects the closed-loop equilibrium relation.
Table 6 contains parameter estimates for the open-loop and the closed-loop pricing re-
lations for all estimated generations. Economies of scale are measured by the logarithm
of current output (LQI). The coeÆcient of this variable is signicantly negative for both
specications and for all generations estimated. It is smaller in the open-loop setting than
in the closed-loop setting. Contemporaneous output has a signicant eect on marginal
cost in the 64K, 256K and 1MB generation. However, in an open-loop setting one would
slightly underestimate this eect.
Now consider the parameter that measures learning-by-doing. The parameter is negative
and signicant for 254K and 1MB. The learning-by-doing parameter in the open-loop
setting is smaller in absolute values than in the closed-loop specication. This is true
for all generations. Learning spillovers are signicant in the 64K and 256K generation.
The estimated conduct parameter 
1
of the 64K generation equals 4:169 in the open-loop
and 9:513 in the closed-loop specication. In case of the 256K (1MB) generation this
parameter has a value of 1:412 (1:748) in the open-loop specication and 2:687 (2:903)
in the closed-loop specication. These results indicate on the one hand above Cournot
pricing and on the other hand an underestimation of this parameter in the open-loop
20
setting. The coeÆcients are all signicant at the 5% level. The coeÆcient of the second
strategic parameter 
2
is signicantly negative for all estimated generations suggesting
that rms react strategically on the objective function of other rms in the next period.
The negative sign of these parameters suggests q
it
and q
js
to be strategic substitutes.
6 Conclusions
In this article, I develop and estimate an empirical model that incorporates the strategic
implications of learning by doing and learning spillovers. I derive a structural model from
a dynamic oligopoly game. I then estimate the model with rm-level data from the DRAM
semiconductor industry. The estimation results support economies of scale, learning by
doing and learning spillovers. Further they suggest that rms consider the reactions of
their rivals when formulating their output strategies.
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A Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Generations of DRAM in the market over time
Year 4K 16K 64K 256K 1MB 2MB 4MB 8MB 16MB 64MB
1974 x - - - - - - - - -
1975 x - - - - - - - - -
1976 x x - - - - - - - -
1977 x x - - - - - - - -
1978 x x - - - - - - - -
1979 x x x - - - - - - -
1980 x x x - - - - - - -
1981 x x x - - - - - - -
1982 x x x x - - - - - -
1983 x x x x - - - - - -
1984 x x x x - - - - - -
1985 x x x x - - - - - -
1986 - - x x x - - - - -
1987 - - x x x - - - - -
1988 - - x x x - x - - -
1989 - - x x x - x - - -
1990 - - x x x - x - - -
1991 - - x x x - x - x -
1992 - - x x x x x - x -
1993 - - x x x x x - x -
1994 - - x x x x x - x -
1995 - - x x x x x - x x
1996 - - - x x x x x x x
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Table 2: Market shares for the 64K, 256K and 1MB generation in % averaged over the
product cycle
Firm 64K 256K 1MB
Advanced Micro Devices 0.13 - -
AT&T Microelectronics - 1.21 0.68
Fairchild 0.00 - -
Fujitsu 11.53 7.85 4.39
G-Link - - 0.06
Hitachi 7.50 15.90 3.76
Hyundai 0.13 2.15 2.29
IBM Microelectronics - - 0.29
Inmos 0.55 0.07 -
Intel 0.92 0.42 0.28
LG Semicon - 0.76 1.54
Matsusihu 14.18 2.45 1.32
Micron 4.03 2.33 2.09
Mitsubishi 5.36 5.15 6.11
Mosel Vitalic 0.01 1.12 1.19
Mostek 2.01 0.04 -
Motorola 6.66 0.53 1.94
National Semiconductor 0.14 0.01 -
NEC 6.07 16.08 4.33
Nippon Steel - 1.23 1.53
OKI 8.90 6.28 3.18
Samsung 17.86 6.15 5.27
Sanyo - 1.74 1.88
Sharp 0.61 1.25 0.63
Siemens 0.73 0.68 2.60
STC-ITT 0.10 - -
Texas Instruments 11.31 6.58 3.55
Toshiba 1.28 3.81 18.71
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Table 3: Summary statistics for the 64k, 256K, and 1MB generation
Variable Statistic 64K 256K 1MB
Industry price Mean 13.0212 11.8362 14.5490
Std. dev. 30.7383 27.2328 22.0765
Min. 0.750 1.624 3.132
Max. 135.000 150.000 110.000
Nobs 68 57 46
Industry output Mean 38717563 88039188 103296567
Std. dev. 60386120 83457093 6357646
Min. 3000 10000 11000
Max. 264395000 242412000 215632700
Nobs 68 57 46
Firm output Mean 3799125 5734476 6692453
Std. dev. 5855855 7726461 6357646
Min. 1000 3000 1000
Max. 31525000 39000000 31500000
Nobs 693 817 710
Table 4: Herndahl indices for the 64K, 256K and 1MB generation over the product cycle
Year 64K 256K 1MB
1979 0.525 - -
1980 0.264 - -
1981 0.177 - -
1982 0.128 1.000 -
1983 0.108 0.265 -
1984 0.092 0.213 -
1985 0.091 0.164 0.964
1986 0.099 0.135 0.369
1987 0.106 0.102 0.337
1988 0.170 0.091 0.151
1989 0.261 0.078 0.104
1990 0.309 0.085 0.094
1991 0.218 0.092 0.080
1992 0.296 0.110 0.073
1993 0.319 0.118 0.070
1994 0.370 0.131 0.084
1995 0.344 0.133 0.087
1996 - 0.290 0.093
Average 0.228 0.201 0.209
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Table 5: Parameter estimates for the inverse demand equation
Two-stage least square estimation
Variable 64K 256K 1MB
Constant -60.2666

-193.1450

-88.9195
(22.44) (19.83) (74.04)
LQ -0.3370

-0.7607

-0.6192

(0.02) (0.06) (0.21)
LQ
S
1
0.0295

0.7953

0.7904

(0.01) (0.14) (0.46)
LQ
S
2
-0.0243

-0.0244

-0.0017
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GNP 2.7940

7.6425

3.2758
(0.91) (0.75) (2.90)
TIME -0.3640

-0.1767

0.1512
(0.06) (0.06) (0.25)
R-squared 0.964 0.979 0.908
Durbin-Watson 0.571 0.905 1.138
Number of observations 68 53 46
General method of moments estimation
Variable 64K 256K 1MB
Constant -55.8031

-178.3104

-76.2658

(11.32) (15.32) (41.85)
LQ -0.3447

-0.6941

-0.6160

(0.02) (0.06) (0.12)
LQ
S
1
0.0295

0.6384

0.7785

(0.01) (0.14) (0.29)
LQ
S
2
-0.0192

-0.0308

-0.0001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
GNP 2.6198

7.1540

2.7884

(0.46) (0.56) (1.69)
TIME -0.3585

-0.2224

0.1609
(0.03) (0.05) (0.16)
R-squared 0.984 0.950 0.907
Number of observations 68 53 46

Signicant at the 10%level

Signicant at the 5% level
Standard Errors in parenthesis.
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Table 6: Pricing relation results: Parameter estimates for the open-loop and for the closed-
loop model
64K 64K 256K 256K 1MB 1MB
Variable open-loop closed-loop open-loop closed-loop open-loop closed-loop
Constant 131.600

206.018

4.375 5.785 244.233

257.527

(27.73) (35.60) (28.90) (30.41) (23.17) (23.55)
LQI -2.054

-2.209

-0.816

-0.874

-1.657

-1.713

(0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22)
Learning -0.153 -0.422 -0.096 -0.341

-0.510

-0.680

(0.31) (0.40) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24)
Spillovers -0.812 -0.922

-0.722

-0.447

0.187 0.294
(0.35) (0.41) (0.22) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)

1
 
1
1.437

3.279

0.980

1.865

1.077

1.788

(0.07) (0.88) (0.03) (0.21) (0.06) (0.14)

1
4.169

9.513

1.412

2.687

1.748

2.903

(0.20) (2.55) (0.04) (0.30) (0.10) (0.23)

2
 
1
 
1
- -2.986

- -1.538

- -1.332

- (1.14) - (0.33) - (0.19)

2
- -0.911

- -0.825

- -0.745

- (0.34) - (0.17) - (0.11)
Material -4.336

-6.713

-2.940

-3.224

1.068 1.014
(2.28) (2.37) (1.07) (1.12) (0.93) (0.94)
Energy 5.750

11.883

1.675 1.529 10.805 11.391

(0.74) (2.60) (1.47) (1.53) (1.21) (1.23)
Labor -2.748

-3.660

4.363

4.499

-15.150

-15.860

(0.88) (0.99) (2.49) (2.63) (1.21) (1.63)
Capital -4.966

-14.214

3.678

3.944

-1.108 -1.960
(0.95) (2.70) (1.01) (1.60) (0.78) (0.80)
Other inputs 7.299

13.705

-5.775

-5.748

5.340

6.415

(3.27) (3.43) (2.91) (3.05) (1.03) (1.15)
F-Test 90.667

81.792

118.407

105.303

77.928

81.321

adj. R-squared 0.775 0.765 0.808 0.791 0.762 0.755
DW 0.772 0.809 0.710 0.725 0.920 1.041
Nobs 693 693 817 817 710 710

Signicant at the 10%level

Signicant at the 5% level
Standard Errors in parenthesis.
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B Appendix: Figures
Figure 1: Average selling prices in USD for dierent generations of DRAMs, 1974-1996
Figure 2: Industry units shipped for dierent generations of DRAMs, 1974-1996
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Figure 3: Firm specic output for the 64K generation, 1974-1996
Figure 4: Firm specic output for the 256K generation, 1974-1996
Figure 5: Firm specic output for the 1MB generation, 1974-1996
30
C Appendix: Notation
q
it
: : : output of rm i at time t,
i = 1; : : : ; n; t = 1; : : : ; T
q
t
:=
P
n
i=1
q
it
: : : industry output at time t
x
it
:=
P
t 1
s=1
q
is
: : : cumulative output of rm i at time t
x
t
:=
P
n
i=1
x
it
: : : cumulative industry output at time t
x
 it
:= (x
1;t
; : : : ; x
i 1;t
; x
i+1;t
; : : : ; x
n;t
) : : : vector of cumulative output of each
rm except of rm i at time t
X
t
= (x
it
)
n
i=1
: : : industry experience vector at time t
W
it
: : : vector of input prices at time t
C
it
:= C(q
it
; x
it
) : : : cost function of rm i at time t
P
t
:= P (q
t
) : : : inverse demand function at time t
s
it
:= P
t

q
it
q
t
: : : price times shares of rm i at time t
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D Appendix: Data description
The data used for estimating represent rms producing DRAMs and are compiled by
Dataquest Inc. The data covers rms' units shipped from the 4K generation to the 64MB
generation and the average selling price. These generations span a time period from
January 1974 to December 1996. The data are available at a quarterly basis. Table 1
shows in which year which generation of DRAMs were in the market. The very rst
generation of DRAMs, namely the 4K generation, emerged in 1974 and stayed in the
market until 1985. Two years after the start o of the 4K generation the 16K generation
was on the market. On average two to three years after one generation has emerged the
following generations goes on market. The last generation - 64MB - went on the market
in 1995 and is still at the beginning of its product cycle. Two exceptions are the 2MB
and the 8MB generations. These are byproducts and do not follow the general pattern.
From the rm-level output data I construct three variables. Namely, current output,
own past cumulative output and other rms' past cumulative output. Current output
serves as measure for economies of scale. The own cumulative output variable represents
learning-by-doing. The cumulative past output of all other rms proxies learning spillovers.
Further I use price data for four important inputs - price of silicon, energy cost, wages for
production and user cost of capital. For the material cost I use the world market price of
silicon compiled by Metal Bulletin. Energy costs and wages of production are compiled in
the following way: according to each rms production location the energy prices and the
industry wages (ISIC 3825) of the concerned location (country) is used. The source for
energy prices is OECD/IEA [17], that for industry wages OECD [16]. User cost of capital
is constructed for each rm and year by exploiting rms annual reports. As a nonprice
demand shifter I use a proportion of GNP directly attributed to electronic and electrical
equipment from the OECD [16]. A time variable also enters the demand equation as a
proxy for the incremental changes in a generation over the life cycle. As substitutes for one
generation I assume its proceeding and following generation. Table 3 gives some summary
statistics.
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